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THE PUZZLING CASE OF MAX FEINBERG:
AN ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS IN
PARTIAL RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE
JEREMY MACKLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION

A.

Traditions Become Uncertain

"On the other hand, can I deny my own daughter? On the
other hand, how can I turn my back on my faith, my people?"'
Tevye's monologue from the motion picture "Fiddler on the Roof'
provides a glimpse into the archetypal mindset of an individual
heavily valuing tradition. Legally, a person can assert control over
future generations in an attempt to preserve tradition; however,
there are limits as to how far and in what ways a person can
assert that control.
In the United States, a person, upon reaching a certain age,
can lawfully determine how and to whom his or her property will
pass upon death. 2 Illinois courts, however, have attempted to limit
this right, 3 creating uncertainty as to how a person can legally
dispose of his or her money and property.
B. The Story of Max Feinberg
The story of Max Feinberg and the controversy surrounding
the Illinois Appellate and Supreme Courts' decisions have the
potential to affect people across the country. Max Feinberg was a
hard-working dentist, working seven days a week to support his
family.4 He valued his Jewish heritage, as evidenced by his

* J.D. 2010, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to thank
Professor Susan Brody for her guidance, as well as his parents, Steven and
Debbie, for their endless support and encouragement.
1. FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (United Artist 1971).
2. WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS 28 (Anderson

Publ'g Co. 2003) (1960).
Traditionally, a person transmits his or her
remaining property to surviving children or grandchildren. John H. Langbein,
The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 722, 736 (1988).
3. In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).

4. George D. Hanus, You Can't Govern from the Grave, WORLD JEWISH
DIG., Oct. 2008, at 11.
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observance of the customary Jewish traditions and membership at
several synagogues. 5
In order to preserve his Jewish faith, Max added a
testamentary provision in his trust that excluded, from his hardearned wealth, grandchildren who married outside his Jewish
faith.6 His goal was to "guarantee his family's Jewish lineage by
drafting a will with monetary compensation."7 At his death, only
one of Max's five grandchildren had married within the Jewish
faith.8 The Illinois Appellate Court considered the following
question: Can a person do what he wants with his money?9 More
specifically, whether a testator can create a testamentary
provision that is conditioned on the potential beneficiary marrying
within a certain class of people?
After answering that question in the negative, the issue was
brought before the Illinois Supreme Court, which took a vastly
different approach than the appellate court: instead of assessing
the validity of Max's provision, it focused on Max's surviving wife's
power of appointment over the distribution of the trusts at issue.10
The Illinois Supreme Court avoided assessing Max's trust
provision and instead held that his wife altered his disputed
testate scheme by exercising her power of appointment." While
the Court addressed some of the concerns raised by the appellate

5. Id. Max's adherence to the Jewish faith and ideals was further evident
in his frightened response when his grandson took a non-Jewish girl to the
high school prom. Id.
6. In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d at 550. See also In re Estate of
Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 891-92 (Ill. 2009) (discussing the provisions of
Max's will). Max executed a "pour over" will, which transferred his assets into
a trust upon his death. Id. at 891. The trust contained the following
provision:
A descendant of mine other than a child of mine who marries outside the
Jewish faith (unless the spouse of such descendant has converted or
converts within one year of the marriage to the Jewish faith) and his or
her descendants shall be deemed to be deceased for all purposes of this
instrument as of the date of such marriage.
In re Estate of Feinberg,891 N.E.2d at 550.
7. Hanus, supra note 4, at 11.
8. Id.
9. Ron Grossman, "Jewish Clause"Dividesa Family, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25,
2008, available at http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/aug/25/nation/chijewish-clauseaug25.
10. In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 891. Max's wife, Erla, actually
exercised her power of appointment by revoking "the original distribution
provision" and replacing it with a plan that gave each grandchild an equal
share, thereby concretizing the amount of money each eligible descendant
would receive at her death. Id. at 891-92.
11. Id. at 902. The Illinois Supreme Court found that "[t]he "validity of a
trust provision [was] not at issue, as the distribution provision of Max's trust
was revoked when Erla exercised her power of appointment." Id.
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court, 12 it left open the question of whether Max's provision,
without a corresponding power of appointment, would be valid if
used by individuals in the future.13
C. The Need For Certainty
Indeed, the answer to the question posed by the Illinois
Appellate Court is uncertain and has been the source of great
confusion in both English and American courts alike.14 State
courts disagree in their analyses of such provisions. While the
Illinois Appellate Court found Max's provision void, 16 other state
courts, such as Ohio and Massachusetts, have found identical
provisions wholly valid.16 The analysis turns on two issues: first,
whether judicial enforcement of certain testamentary provisions
involves a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violation;1 7 and
second, whether public policy considerations vary depending on
the overall effect of the testamentary provision.18
Part II of this Comment provides a background on wills and
trusts and explains the various types of marriage restraints
commonly employed in conditional testamentary provisions. Part
III assesses the constitutional issues by contrasting the right to
marry with the privilege of inheritance. This section argues that
the judicial enforcement of discriminatory conditions is not the
type of state action the Supreme Court intended to preclude in its
12. See infra pp. 275-76 (discussing the reasoning of both the Illinois
Appellate Court and Illinois Supreme Court).
13. In re Estate of Feinberg,919 N.E.2d at 893 (writing that the court "need
not consider whether Max's original testamentary scheme is void as a matter
of public policy."); Debra Cassens Weiss, Grandkids Who Lost Inheritance for
MarryingNon-Jews Lose Appeal, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/grandkids wholostinheritance for.marrying-non-jews
lose-appeal/.
14. See Ransdell v. Boston, 50 N.E. 111, 113 (Ill. 1898) (explaining that
there is always uncertainty in defining which conditions in restraint of
marriage are void and which are valid).
15. In re Estate Feinberg,891 N.E.2d at 552.
16. See Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827-32 (Ohio Misc.
1974) (upholding a provision requiring the decedent's son to marry a Jewish
girl with Jewish parents); Gordon v. Gordon 124 N.E.2d 228, 231-33 (Mass.
1955) (upholding a provision that revoked gifts to beneficiaries who married
individuals not born into the Jewish faith).
17. See Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 827 (discussing the plaintiff's argument
that the right to marry is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States).
18. See, e.g., Winterland v. Winterland, 59 N.E.2d 661, 663 (111. 1945)
(holding that a "testamentary provision tending to disturb or destroy an
existing marriage" by encouraging divorce is against public policy); see also In
re Silverstein's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1956) (holding that
"[c]onditions in partial restraint of marriage "which merely impose reasonable
restrictions upon marriage are not against public policy.").
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Shelley v. Kraemer decision. Part IV analyzes the public policy
issues surrounding testamentary dispositions and argues that
partial restraints conditioning the receipt of property on a person
marrying within a certain class of persons are distinguishable
from those encouraging divorce and thus are generally valid. Part
IV also argues that testamentary provisions that do not act as
continuing inducements cannot contravene public policy. Part V
analyzes the contradictions between the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts and the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative
Transfers) and proposes that in order to provide certainty to those
creating testamentary provisions and effectuate the relevant
competing policies, state legislatures need to codify a statute or
regulation based on the Restatement (Second) of Property
(Donative Transfer) and its "unreasonable limitation" approach.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Wills and Trusts
It is important to start with an understanding of the basic
definitions and rules that govern wills and trusts. When a person
dies, his or her property passes to another person through either
intestacy, dying without a valid will or trust, or a testamentary
method.19 This Comment focuses on two testamentary methods:
wills and trusts.
1.

Wills

A will is a written document that contains the dying wishes of
a person; it details how and to whom his or her property will be
distributed upon death. 20 A person creating a will may attach
conditions to the receipt of the estate, 21 subject only to those
conditions not being illegal or against public policy. 22 The
disposition of the property takes effect upon the death of the
instrument's creator. 23 In order to become effective, however, the
19. WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS, 1
(Anderson Publ'g Co. 2003) (1901).
20. Id.
21. WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS
488 (The W.H. Anderson Co. 2005) (1901). A will provision is only conditional
when it vests, enlarges, or defeats a property interest. Id. Conditions can be
either precedent or subsequent. Id. A condition precedent is a condition
vesting or enlarging an estate when an event occurs or fails to occur. Id. A
condition subsequent determines an estate already vested upon a certain
event happening or not happening. Id. at 488-89.
When construing
conditions, those provisions "which tend to defeat estates are construed quite
strictly." Id. at 493.
22. Id. at 494.
23. See, e.g., Kidwell v. Rhew, 268 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Ark. 2007).
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person seeking to receive the property must prove that the will
was properly executed and that the creator, or testator, had
testamentary capacity 24 at the time he or she created the
instrument. 25 Thus, the law uses the term "probate property" to
refer to property that is transferred through a will. 26

2. Trusts
A trust is another way of disposing of property, distinct from
a will, 27 and can be created by a will or other written instrument. 28
A private trust exists where one or more people, called trustees,
hold property but are obligated to convey that property for the
Such a
benefit of a person, 29 known as the beneficiary. 30
conveyance is subject to the terms set forth by its creator, the
settlor.31 An important distinction between a trust and a will is
that a trust is effective as of its delivery and does not require
probate. 32 With respect to donative transfers given upon death or
24. Testamentary capacity refers to the competency of the testator; the law
requires that the testator be an adult who comprehends the nature of his
property, those people benefiting from the testamentary instrument, and the
property being distributed. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 141 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 7th ed. 2005).
25. DANIEL SMITH REMSEN, THE PREPARATION AND CONTEST OF WILLS 5

(Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1907).
26. DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 28.
27. Kidwell, 268 S.W.3d at 312.
28. THOMAS CONYNGTON ET AL., WILLS, ESTATES, AND TRUSTS 364 (The
Ronald Press Co. 1921). A trust need not be formally written. THOMAS L.
SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 90 (Harry W.
Jones ed., The Foundation Press Inc. 2nd ed. 1979) (1972). A trust can be
treated as a will and given the same effect when characterized as
testamentary. Id. at 94. However, if the trust does not take effect at the
testator's death, "it is inoperable as a will." BOWE & PARKER, supra note 21,
at 134.
29. 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 1 (2008); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 2 (2003) (stating that a trust is "a fiduciary relationship with respect
to property . .. which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to
create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the
property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more
persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee").
30. CONYNGTON, supra note 28, at 359. While private and charitable trusts
are both executed for a beneficiary, a charitable trust benefits public
communities. Kathryn F. Voyer, Continuing the Trend Toward Equality: The
Eradication of Racially and Sexually Discriminatory Provisions in Private
Trusts, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 954 (1999). This principle difference
necessitates a different Fourteenth Amendment analysis for private trusts
distinct from charitable trusts, as will be discussed in Part III.
31. DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 30.
32. REMSEN, supra note 25, at 5. A trust avoids probate because the trust
creator, while still living, "transfers assets into the name of the trustee or
name of the trust." Shelley Steiner, Incentive Conditions: The Validity of

Innovative FinancialParentingby PassingAlong Wealth and Values, 40 VAL.
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contingent on future events, wills and trusts accomplish the same
purpose, and their provisions are generally subject to the same
33
requirements of legality and consistency with public policy.
B. Restraints-Generaland Partial
A person creating a will or a trust may disinherit descendents
for any reason if that exclusion is unconditionally stated. 34 For
example, a father can write in his will that his son or daughter
should not receive any of his money or property when he dies, with
or without an explanation. A problem arises, however, when
testators attempt to influence the behavior of beneficiaries by
attaching conditions to the inheritance of money and property.35
Conditional restraints surface in two forms: total (or general)
restraints and partial restraints. A total restraint is one that is
"unrestricted in time or number."6 In particular, a will provision
conditioning property on the transferee never marrying 37 or not
remarrying once becoming a widow or widower, 38 function as total
U. L. REV. 897, 903 (2006).
33. Id.
34. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory
of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 99 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1273, 1277 (1999); see also In re Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658, 660 (N.Y.
1939) (holding that a testator can exclude children or other descendants from
benefiting from his wealth for any reason at all, whether sound or
unreasonably prejudicial). A parent may disinherit a child for no reason at all.
See Sloger v. Sloger, 186 N.E.2d 288, 290 (Ill. 1962) (holding that "[t]he fact
that the testator's property was divided unequally between those presumably
having a claim on his bounty may be attributed to any number of reasons,
either fair or unfair."). A parent may also disinherit a child for discriminatory
reasons. See Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N.Y. 190, 197 (1866) (holding that "[t]he
right of a testator to dispose of his estate depends neither on the justice of his
prejudices nor the soundness of his reasoning.").
35. JAMES A. CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 591 (A. James Casner ed., Little,
Brown and Co.) (1952).
36. E. LeFevre, Annotation, Validity of Provisions of Will or Deed
Prohibiting, Penalizing, or Requiring Marriage to One of a Particular
Religious Faith,50 A.L.R. 2D 740, § 2 at 740 (1956).
37. Id.; see also Watts v. Griffin, 50 S.E. 218, 220 (N.C. 1905) (holding that
a condition not to marry "common women" was a general restraint on
marriage).
38. Sherman, supra note 34, at 1317. But some testamentary provisions
conditioning money on a person refraining from remarrying have been held
valid. See Glass v. Johnson, 130 N.E. 473, 474 (Ill. 1921) (holding that a
testator may condition his or her living spouse benefiting from the will upon
that spouse remaining unmarried); Raulerson v. Saffold, 61 So. 2d 926, 926
(Fla. 1952) (upholding a provision whereby the husband devised property on
the condition that his wife not remarry); Baldwin v. Baldwin, 2 N.W.2d 23, 2425 (Neb. 1942) (upholding a provision bequeathing property to the testator's
wife provided that she remained single).
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restraints on marriage. Total restraints are generally held to be
contrary to public policy and, thus, invalid.3 9
A partial restraint, on the other hand, is one where the
testator conditions a transfer of property on the passage of time or
the grantee pursuing certain actions set forth by the testator. 40 A
partial restraint is subject to a reasonableness test; the restraint
will be "valid or invalid according to whether it is reasonable or
unreasonable." 41 Determining the reasonableness of a partial
restraint requires courts to investigate the facts surrounding the
restraint, the terms the provision employs, the relationship of the
parties, and the purpose for which the restraint was imposed. 42
The purpose of this Comment is to examine partial restraints that
influence the marriage of those who are situated to benefit from
the testator's trust or will4 3 and analyze the legal as well as policy
39. LeFevre, supra note 36, § 2 at 740; see also Watts, 50 S.E. at 219
(holding that 'law will not recognize and enforce conditions in restraint of
marriage"); Glass, 130 N.E. at 474 (holding that "a testator may not impose a
total restraint upon marriage as a condition of a devise").
40. LeFevre, supra note 36, § 2 at 740. Conditions requiring the transferee
to take action in order to receive money from the testator are also referred to
as incentive conditions. Steiner, supra note 32, at 897.
41. LeFevre, supra note 36, § 2 at 740. A partial restraint is unreasonable
when its effect approaches that of a general restraint. CASNER, supra note 35,
at 655. Reasonable does not necessarily mean objective or unbigoted, since
many conditions are upheld as valid that may be deemed "bigoted" by the
term's common meaning. ALEXANDER A. BOVE, JR., THE COMPLETE BOOK OF
WILLS, ESTATES & TRUSTS 76 (Henry Hold & Co. 2nd ed. 2000) (2000). Partial
restraints imposing reasonable restrictions are generally valid. BOWE &
PARKER, supra note 21, at 556. "The likely effect of the provisions of a will on
the person to be influenced rather than the personal purpose of the testator"
will determine whether the provision is valid or void. In re Will of Collura,
415 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1979).
42. Harbin v. Judd, 340 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960); see also
Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266, 273 (1883) (holding that the
reasonableness of partial restraints depends largely "upon the circumstances
of particular cases.").
43. A restraint "unreasonably limits the transferee's opportunity to marry
if a marriage permitted by the restraint is not likely to occur." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (1983). This analysis
inevitably turns on the facts of each case to determine the likelihood of
marriage. Id. Conditions in restraint of marriage date back to the age of the
Romans. CASER, supra note 35, at 643. The Romans prohibited such
provisions fearing "depopulation resulting from the civil wars." Id. At English
law,
all conditions in wills restraining marriage whether precedent or
subsequent, whether there was any gift over or not, and however
qualified, were absolutely void; and marriage simply was a sufficient
compliance with a condition requiring marriage with consent, or with a
particular individual, or under any other restrictive circumstances.
THOMAS JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 1514 (Sweet & Maxwell 1951). The
English rationale was founded on the idea that "such restraints promote
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concerns surrounding the transfer of property.44

C. PartialRestraints on Marriage
Partial restraints on marriage generally fall into four main
categories: (1) requiring consent to marry; (2) refraining from
marriage until attaining a certain age; (3) requiring divorce from a
spouse; and (4) requiring that the beneficiary's spouse belong to a
particular group.45

1. Consent Conditions
The first class of marriage restraints centers on consent by a
designated person that the transferee can marry a certain
individual. 46 A testator creates this type of condition by conferring
property on the condition that a third party consents to the
beneficiary marrying his or her chosen mate, such as a testator
requiring his son to consent to his daughter's chosen husband in
order for her to benefit. 47 Courts generally hold that such
conditions are void.48 But there is authority upholding a finding to
the contrary where the intentions of the party withholding consent
are reasonable.4 9

licentiousness and offend the divinely inspired precept that multiplication of
the human race shall be by the medium of matrimony." CASNER, supra note
35, at 644. However, the English Court of Chancery acknowledged that public
policy concerns surrounding general restraints have no application to partial
restraints. Id. "The state of the American authorities is strikingly parallel to
that of the English." Id. at 646. United States courts generally allow
conditions in partial restraint of marriage. JARMAN, supra note 43, at 1514.
44. See Matter of Estate of Walker, 476 N.E.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. 1985)
(holding that the "law permits a person possessing testamentary capacity to
dispose of property to any person in any manner and for any object or purpose
so long as such disposition is not illegal or against public policy").
45. See generally McCoy v. Flynn, 151 N.W. 465, 467 (Iowa 1915)
(explaining that conditions not to marry until a certain age, without the
consent of parents, guardians, or trustees, or not to marry a particular person,
or a person belonging to a specific religious group are conditions in partial
restraint of marriage).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. e
(1983). The Restatement provides the following example of a restraint based
on consent: "0, by an otherwise effective will, bequeaths $200,000 to T in trust
to pay the income thereof 'to my daughter D for her life, but if she ever
marries without the consent of T, said income shall be paid to my son S for his
life."' Id. § 6.2 cmt. e, illus. 7.
47. See, e.g., Liberman, 18 N.E.2d at 659 (describing a will provision
conditioning the money a son could receive on the beneficiary's brother and
sister consenting to his choice of a proper spouse).
48. Id. at 662 (holding that "the natural tendency of the condition contained
in the will is to restrain all marriages and for that reason it is void").
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. e
(1983). A consent condition is unreasonable if it extends "beyond the maturity
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2. Age Conditions
A testator can also condition the receipt of money or property
on a person refraining from marriage until attaining a certain
age.50 For example, courts have enforced a provision where a
testator conditioned the transfer of property on a transferee not
marrying until the age of twenty-one.5 1 Despite the express
condition, the age set forth by the testator cannot preclude
marriage beyond a reasonable age. 52

3. Divorce Conditions
Testators also attempt to exert control by enticing the
transferee to obtain a divorce from his or her current spouse. 53
Authorities agree that provisions requiring divorce are invalid and
cannot be given effect. 54 The underlying rationale for invalidating
such conditions is in keeping with the importance of protecting the
family.5 5
Some courts, however, look to whether the testator
intended a legal or an illegal divorce.5 6
of the transferee." Id.
50. Id. Language effecting this type of condition may take the following
form: "to my son S and his heirs, but if he marries before attaining the age of
25, to my daughter D and her heirs." Id. § 6.2 cmt. d, illus. 5.
51. See Shackelford v. Hall, 1857 WL 5691, at *1 (Ill. Dec. 1857) (upholding
a provision forfeiting a child's receipt of money on abstaining from marriage
until the age of twenty-one). Conditions in restraint of marriage until a
certain age should be distinguished from those where the testator's clear
intent is to provide support until marriage. See Mann v. Jackson, 24 Atl. 886,
888 (Me. 1892) (holding that a testator's devise of his home to his daughter
until she married was valid because the testator clearly intended to "furnish
support until other means should be provided").
52. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Osborn, 118 N.E. 446, 452 (Ill. 1917) (holding a
clause conditioning money on the transferee not marrying before a certain age
valid because "it did not absolutely prohibit the marriage of the party, within
the period wherein issue of the marriage might be expected"). In reaching
that holding, the Illinois Supreme Court also reasoned that the testator did
not "impose perpetual celibacy upon the objects of his bounty." Id.
53. See In re Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ill. 1975) (describing a
will provision where the testator turned over property to his son upon the son
obtaining a divorce and remaining divorced for two years).
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003) (explaining
that a trust provision may not "confer a beneficial interest upon a beneficiary
if he or she obtains a divorce or legal separation"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 (1983) (describing that a provision is
"invalid where the dominant motive of the transferor was to promote such a
separation"); Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d at 33 (holding that provisions designed to
induce divorce exert "a disruptive influence upon an otherwise normally
harmonious marriage" and thus are void).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. a
(1983).
56. Compare Baker v. Hickman, 273 P. 480, 486 (Kan. 1929) (upholding a
will provision where the testator intended a legal separation pursuant to a
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4. Marriage Within a Class Conditions
The last variety of marriage restraint is the kind that Max
Feinberg attempted to use to encourage his grandchildren to
marry within a particular class of people, the Jewish community.5 7
This type of restraint may take many forms, for example,
marrying within the same culture58 or religion.59 Courts are split
as to whether restraints of this sort are valid.6 0
The two relevant Restatements of the law take extremely
different approaches.6 1 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts takes
statute), with Fleishman v. Bregel, 197 A. 593, 597-98 (Md. 1938) (finding
invalid a trust provision attempting to induce a divorce where the husband
and wife were happily married). An illegal divorce is one tending to induce a
couple to live separately or to be divorced where there is no ground for divorce.
Id. at 598. A legal divorce is that which is based on some ground recognized
by the law, and a condition restricting a legal divorce is "valid if it is made by
way of provision for an existing or an anticipated separation, or for any other
reason does not operate as an inducement to a separation." Id.
57. In re Estate of Feinberg,891 N.E.2d at 550.
58. See In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967) (describing a
will conditioning a gift on the testator's children marrying individuals of
Greek blood).
59. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ferguson, 8 S.E. 241, 241 (Va. 1888) (describing a
will conditioning the bequest of money on the testator's children not marrying
into a specific family). Testamentary provisions of this nature are generally
upheld. See Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 826 (describing a will provision gifting the
testator's son property only if he married a girl of the Jewish faith). People
have also written testamentary provisions attempting to prohibit marriage
within a certain class of people or to a certain person. See Taylor v. Rapp, 124
S.E.2d 271, 271-72 (Ga. 1962) (upholding a will provision devising the
testator's money on the condition that the testator's daughter not marry a
certain individual). This affirmed a Georgia statute stating the following:
"Prohibiting marriage to a particular person or persons, or before a certain
reasonable age, or other prudential provisions looking only to the interest of
the person to be benefited, and not in general restraint of marriage, will be
allowed and held valid." Id.; see also Hall v. Eaton, 631 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (holding that "[a]ttempts to prevent unmarried children from
marrying named individuals (partial restraints), or from marrying before a
certain age, or from marrying without consent, are valid.").
60. Compare U.S. Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 86272 (Or. 1954) (upholding a testamentary provision conditioning the bequest of
property on the beneficiary not marrying an individual of the Catholic faith),
and Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 231-33 (Mass. 1955) (upholding a
provision that revoked gifts to beneficiaries who married individuals not born
into the Jewish faith), with In Re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d at 549
(finding invalid a trust provision that revoked gifts to beneficiaries that
married individuals not born into the Jewish faith), and Maddox v. Maddox,
52 Va. (1 Gratt.) 804, 817-18 (1854) (finding void a will provision requiring the
testator's daughter to marry a member of a religious society).
61. The two Restatements relevant in the area of trusts and estates are the
Restatement (Second) Property (Donative Transfers) and the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts. MARK REUTLINGER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 7 (Aspen
Publishers, Inc. 1998) (1993). "Restatements are not themselves law, but they
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the position that any condition attempting to limit the
beneficiary's selection of a spouse is invalid, blurring together the
aforementioned categories of restraints. 62 In contrast, the drafters
of the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers)
would uphold this type of partial restraint with two minor
exceptions: (1) where the transferee's religious belief is
substantially different from that required by the condition, so that
marriage will not likely occur; or (2) where the number of potential
spouses eliminated by the condition is negligible.63
D. The FeinbergDecisions

The Illinois Appellate Court decision holding Max Feinberg's
testamentary provision invalid as against public policy, while
overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court,64 Still sheds light on the
"broader tension between the competing values of freedom of
testation on one hand and resistance to 'dead hand' control on the
other."6 5 First, the majority treated Max's testamentary condition
as one encouraging divorce rather than restricting marriage to a
particular class. Justice Cunningham compared Max's clause to
will provisions in three prior Illinois Supreme Court cases where
the testators conditioned the testamentary bequest on the
beneficiary obtaining a divorce.66 Additionally, the majority relied
on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts in finding that the condition
violated public policy,6 7 when in fact the case law cited as
authority for its proposition is unrelated to the Feinberg case and

can strongly influence the enactment of reform and state legislation." Id. The
drafters of the Restatements intent was to simplify or restate the common law
of the United States. GEORGE LEFCOE & DAVID A. THOMAS, THOMPSON ON
REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION 5 (David A. Thomas ed., Lexis
Publ'g 2000) (1994). However, "in recent years the Restatements have often
become proposals for change." REUTLINGER, supra note 61, at 6.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003). The Restatement
(Third) of Trusts lumps conditions limiting the transferee's choice of spouse to
a certain class with those encouraging divorce or separation. Id.
63. RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. c (1983). The
Restatement justifies this rule by explaining that "[flreedom in the choice of a
mate is favored by public policy, but, like all freedoms, is subject to
qualification." Id. § 6.2 cmt. a (1983).
64. While the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
decision, the split in reasoning among the appellate justices is still relevant in
assessing the validity of such provisions.
65. In re Estate of Feinberg,919 N.E.2d at 894.
66. In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d at 550-51. The majority described
the language used by the testator in the three cases (Ransdell v. Boston, 50
N.E. 111 (1898), Gerbing, and Winterland) as "strikingly similar to the instant
case" and saw "no reason to depart from the well-established principle." Id. at
551.
67. Id. at 552.
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thus sheds no light on whether that particular Restatement
provision is persuasive authority in Illinois.6 8
In his concurring opinion, Justice Quinn noted that such
provisions may violate the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the
majority never fully addressed this seemingly dormant
constitutional issue.69
Justice Greiman's dissent pointed to
various flaws in the majority's argument and made an equally
compelling case for upholding the provision, pointing to more
analogous cases in other jurisdictions. 70 Thus, the disagreement
among the appellate court justices, conflicting laws in sister states,
and avoidance of this precise issue by the Illinois Supreme Court
signify the uncertainty surrounding this issue and the need for a
clear answer.

III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FACTOR

While the testamentary document itself does not violate any
constitutional guarantee, courts have considered whether judicial
enforcement of testamentary provisions in wills and trusts violates
the Federal Constitution.7' The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a
state from denying any person "life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . [or] the equal protection of the laws." 72
While the right to marry is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, this right only applies when the government
discriminates against citizens and generally not when private
citizens discriminate against other citizens. 73 Private conduct may
68. Id. at 557 (Greiman, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 554 (Quinn, J., concurring). Justice Quinn wrote that Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), in holding that courts cannot enforce racially
restrictive terms of an agreement, applied to provisions like the one Max
Feinberg created. Id. Additionally, he wrote that asking courts to enforce
such a provision would be enforcing "the worst bigotry imaginable." Id.
Although the Shapira court held that there were no constitutional issues
(distinguishing between a right to marry and a privilege of inheritance),
Justice Quinn found that the court's "rationale may be a distinction without a
difference." Id.
70. Id. at 555-56 (Greiman, J., dissenting). Justice Greiman stated that the
Illinois case law cited as persuasive authority by the majority involved
testamentary provisions through which the testator made "an effort to direct
the legatee-descendants to obtain a divorce," which is not analogous to
Feinberg. Id. Justice Greiman also noted that "there is precedent to the
contrary in other states" founded on case law more factually related to Max
Feinberg's case than those cases cited by the majority. Id.
71. See Matter of Estate of Adolph Donner, 623 A.2d 307, 308 (N.J. Ct. App.
Div. 1993) (holding that testamentary dispositions should be enforced unless
contrary to a rule of law). A private discriminatory agreement by itself does
not violate any Fourteenth Amendment guarantees or rights. Shelley, 334
U.S. at 13.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
73. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). The Supreme Court held
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only violate the Fourteenth Amendment when the state becomes
entangled in the private conduct of citizens.74 The United States
Supreme Court found such entanglement in Shelley v. Kraemer,
where it held that a court enforcing racially discriminatory
restrictive covenants was a state action that violates the
Constitution.75

A. Restricting the Privilege of Succession, Not the Right to
Marry
Few other courts have addressed the state action doctrine as
applied to discriminatory restrictive conditions in wills and
trusts. 76 The principal argument for invalidating a condition in
partial restraint of marriage arises under the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement that a person's freedom to choose a
spouse not be infringed upon by discrimination.7 7 The Court has
emphasized that the right to marry is a right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, labeling the right as "fundamental."78
Thus, in theory, a court enforcing such a condition could violate
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right to marry, however, should be distinguished from
the right to take property. The Court in Magoun v. Illinois Trust
& Savings Bank held that the right to take property by devise or
descent is a privilege and not a natural right.79 The Court
recognized this dichotomy between rights protected by the

that the Fourteenth Amendment "is not general legislation upon the rights of
the citizen, but corrective legislation." Id.; see also Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful"). Private individuals do not have to act in
compliance with the Constitution. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 507 (Aspen Publishers 2006) (1997).
74. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 527.
75. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14. There, the Court wrote that "action of state
courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as
action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
76. See Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 228 (discussing the validity of a will
provision revoking the testator's testamentary gift to his children if they
married "a person not born in the Hebrew faith"); see also Shapira,315 N.E.2d
at 826 (discussing the validity of a will provision where the testator
conditioned the gift of money on his son marrying "a Jewish girl whose both
parents were Jewish").
77. Shapira,315 N.E.2d at 827.
78. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The freedom to marry lies
with the individual and cannot be infringed on by the states. Id.
79. 170 U.S. 283, 288 (1898). In Magoun, an individual asserted that the
right to inherit was a natural right. Id. at 283; see also Shapira, 315 N.E.2d
at 827 (noting that the court was not enforcing a restriction upon the right to
marry, but rather a testator's restriction placed upon inheritance).
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Fourteenth Amendment8 0 and the privilege to take property in the
area of inheritance taxes.8 1 The Court, in holding that states
taxing the right to succeed property does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, reasoned that the tax was on the
privilege of succession and not on the property itself.82
A marked analogy can be drawn between testamentary
conditions based on marrying within a certain class of people. A
court enforcing a testamentary provision is affecting the
individual's privilege of receiving property and not the
fundamental right to marry. In the same way that a tax is
seemingly placed on property, it may appear to an ordinary person
that a condition is placed on the beneficiary's actions. However,
just as the Court clarified that the tax was on the transfer of the
property between individuals, the marriage condition is, in the
same way, on the transfer of property between individuals and not
on any individual rights.83
Thus, since the right to take property by succession is the
only relevant right involved, judicial enforcement of Max
Feinberg's testamentary conditions does not violate any
constitutional guarantee. 84
B. Even if a Right to Marry Were Implicated,Judicial
Enforcement of Testamentary ProvisionsDoes Not
Violate the FourteenthAmendment
Shelley does not apply to judicial enforcement of private
testamentary provisions restricting marriage8 5 because a court

80. The right to own property is a right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which precludes states from depriving
any person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
81. See Magoun, 170 U.S. at 288 (holding that an inheritance tax does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the tax is not on the property
itself, but on the succession of the property).
82. Id.; see also Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 541 (1919) (affirming that
an inheritance tax did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the tax
was "not upon property, but upon the privilege of succession"); Keeney v.
Comptroller of N.Y., 222 U.S. 525, 535 (1912) (holding that an inheritance tax
is a tax on the transfer of the property "intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after the death of [the] grantor" and not on the property
itself).
83. While it may be argued that inheritance taxes are distinguishable from
taking property through testamentary methods, the privilege of acquiring
property through trusts and wills has "frequently been classed with death
duties, legacy and inheritance taxes." Keeney, 222 U.S. at 533-34.
84. See Magoun, 170 U.S. at 288 (holding that the right to take property by
devise may be taxed by the states, and states may even go so far as to
discriminate between relatives).
85. See Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 866 (holding that Shelley is limited to the
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enforcing such a condition is not the type of government
participation the Court intended to preclude through its holding.
In Shelley, the Court declined to divest title to land out of
petitioners' name, which would have required it to affirmatively
eject them from their property.86 The Court used a "but for" test,
describing that but for the active judicial enforcement of the
covenant, the "petitioners would have been free to occupy the
propert[y]."87
Therefore, the Court, in defining state action,
intended merely to prevent active intervention of state courts into
private disputes.88 Following this decision, the Court has failed to
clarify or alter its holding.89 The Court's true intent can only be
discovered through a fact-based analysis of subsequent cases
invoking the judicial enforcement exception.9 0
In Barrows v. Jackson, the United States Supreme Court
refused to step in and enter an award for damages on the basis
that imposing a monetary sanction on those individuals not
abiding by racial covenants would encourage the use of
discriminatory restrictive covenants.*91
The Seventh Circuit in Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts

mere proposition that courts violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing covenants "in a deed restricting the use
and occupancy of real property to persons of the Caucasian race" and nothing
more). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2
cmt c. (1983) (cautioning that judicial enforcement of a restraint designed to
prevent the marriage of a transferee to an individual of a different race may be
state action, possibly violating the transferee's rights to equal protection of the
law under the Fourteenth Amendment). The Ohio Court of Common Pleas
posited that had the right to marry been affected by the discriminatory
provision at issue, the doctrine outlined in Shelley would apply. Shapira, 315
N.E.2d at 827-28.
86. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 6.
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. Justice Vinson, who wrote for the majority in Shelley, reiterated in
a later decision that judicial enforcement of private discrimination only
applies when the court's decision operates "directly against" the person
seeking to invalidate the discriminatory provision. Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 261 (1953) (Vinson, J., dissenting).
89. Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 473, 474 (1962). Even legal scholars have trouble attempting to
explain the holding of the case. Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer
Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 454 (2007).
90. See Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts Inc., 919 F.2d 1281, 1284 (7th
Cir. 1990) (describing that a state action determination "must be based on the
specific facts and the entire context of a given case"). "Only by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances can the nonobivious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id.
91. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 253-54. The Court explained that sanctioning the
respondent for failure to abide by the discriminatory covenant would have the
effect of coercing her into using the property in a discriminatory manner. Id.
at 254.
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used the Shelley doctrine in analyzing the district court's
enforcements of a litigant's peremptory challenge on racial
grounds. 92 In finding state action, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that enforcing the discrimination would require the judge to
affirmatively excuse a juror, thereby placing its power behind the
discrimination.9 3 The Court also addressed a court's participation
in peremptory challenges, explaining that state action by courts
requires "overt, significant assistance of the court."9 4
The District Court of Rhode Island in Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
United Textile Workers also used the Shelley framework in finding

that a court enforcing a collective bargaining agreement was state
action, violating the Fourteenth Amendment.9 5 By enforcing such
an agreement, the court would be required to affirmatively
implement the arbitration provision set forth in the agreement, 96
amounting to state action.
When a court is asked to enforce a testamentary provision in
a will, its task is to determine the testator's intent by analyzing
the words used and then construing them in accordance with their
common meaning;97 that intent controls, and the court must do no
more. 98 To enforce a similar provision in a trust, the judiciary
determines the creator's intent and then applies the necessary law
to allow the continued administration of that trust.9 9
92. 919 F.2d at 1282.
93. Id. at 1286. The court emphasized the trial judge's "control over the
jury and its selection procedures." Id. Judge Ripple, writing for the dissent,
would have required even more judicial involvement to rise to the level of state
action; he explained that a judge takes no affirmative role in preemptory
challenges and insisted on a more narrow reading of Shelley. Id. at 1294-95.
94. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). The
Edmonson Court emphasized that the purpose of a peremptory challenge
would be frustrated without the "indispensable participation of the judge." Id.
The same cannot be said for enforcement of conditional testamentary
dispositions, which can be enforced on a purely private level.
Collective bargaining
95. 391 F. Supp. 287, 298 (D.C. R.I. 1975).
agreements generally contain provisions requiring arbitration. Id. at 292.
96. Id. at 298-99.
97. Walker, 476 N.E.2d at 300.
98. Id.
99. In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1237 (N.Y. 1983). But see
Voyer, supra note 30, at 969 (writing that probate courts sanction
discrimination by validating and enforcing testamentary trusts).
It is
important now to outline the important differences between private and
charitable trusts in the state action context, as many courts have ruled and
experts have written on the subject matter. The state is much more involved
in charitable trusts; the state grants such trusts tax immunity, gives the
terms a modern meaning through cy pres, and plays a key role in designating
and regulating the trustees. Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard,66 YALE L. J. 979, 1003-04 (1957).
Thus, judicial enforcement of charitable trusts, while not discussed in great
detail in this Comment, is vastly different from private trusts.
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In enforcing will and trust provisions, the court is a neutral
party that permits the discriminatory contractual instruments
without direct involvement. 100 This permissive involvement is in
stark contrast with awarding damages, dismissing a juror, and
strictly compelling arbitration. The first is not the type of full
judicial coercive power, 0 1 active intervention,102 or act directly
against an individual's rights 103 that Shelley meant to preclude;
the court is not itself discriminating, compelling another to
discriminate, or allowing another person or entity to discriminate
on its behalf.10 4 So long as the judges are not motivated by any
discriminatory intent in enforcing testamentary conditions, there
should be no state action. 05
When applying this analysis to a Feinberg-type provision, it
becomes quite apparent that an Illinois court enforcing Max's
provision would not be considered a state actor that violates the
Constitution. Instead, the judge would merely be permitting the
trustee to distribute the money in accordance with Max's terms.
The Illinois Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, recognized this notion
and explained that the court has "been reluctant to base a finding
of state action 'on the mere fact that a state court is the forum for
10 6
the dispute."'
Experts agree that such a broad application of Shelley would
essentially extend the Fourteenth Amendment to all action, both
private and public,10 7 a consequence the United States Supreme

100. See Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1236 (noting that the state court's "neutral
regulation of contracts permitting parties to enter discriminatory agreements"
did not give rise to state action in Shelley, but rather its "exercise of its judicial
power [that] directly effected a discriminatory act" made it a state actor).
101. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
102. Id.
103. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 261 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
104. Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1235. The Wilson court held that a court
applying trust principles that permit private discrimination is not state action,
so long as it does not "encourage, affirmatively promote, or compel it." Id. at
1237. The court even went so far as to say that a court replacing a trustee
who is unwilling to act is not state action. Id. Courts have echoed this notion
that a court appointing a fiduciary is not state action. See, e.g., Wilcox v.
Horan, 178 F.2d 162, 165 (10th Cir. 1949) (holding that a court appointing a
guardian to assume custody is not sufficient state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
105. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1970) (factoring into the
state action analysis the Georgia court's lack of racial animus or
discriminatory intent in construing and enforcing the will).
106. In re Estate of Feinberg,919 N.E.2d at 905.
107. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 528 (explaining that if state court
decisions are state action, "then ultimately all private actions must comply
with the Constitution."); see also Rosen, supra note 89, at 453 (writing that
applying Shelley in a broad sense would blur the distinction between state and
private action).
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Court justices did not foresee. 108 Further, courts mainly apply
Shelley to racial discrimination,109 suggesting the Court's holding
is contextually limited.
While not formally addressed in this Comment, it is
important to note other possible constitutional concerns regarding
discriminatory conditions in wills and trusts, including violations
of the First Amendment's guaranty of religious freedom,110 the
privileges and immunities clause and due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,11 1 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.112
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY FACTOR

Courts should also analyze public policy concerns in
determining the validity of a testamentary disposition conditioned
on marriage to a particular class of individuals.113 United States
law places great importance on marriage, familyll4 and the
freedom to bequeath property, resulting in a clash between the
policies in favor of marriage and the freedom of testation.115 Thus,
108. See Henkin, supra note 89, at 477.
109. See Rosen, supra note 89, at 458 (explaining that courts have not
extended Shelley outside the context of racial discrimination).
110. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 234-35. The Gordon court addressed the First
Amendment argument by simply stating, "There is no condition based on the
religious belief of anyone at the time of marriage." Id. at 235. But see
Keffalas, 233 A.2d at 250 (holding that a condition influencing the choice of a
spouse is "too remote to be regarded as coercive" of the beneficiary's religious
faith).
111. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 234-35.
112. Florence Wagman Roisman, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
on Racially Discriminatory Donative Transfers, 53 ALA. L. REV. 463, 467
(2002). While Section 1982 only applies to race discrimination, the Supreme
Court has recognized that Jews "were among the people then considered to be
distinct races and hence within the protection of the statute." Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987). Roisman applied Section
1982 to Shapira and argued that the federal statute prevents a person "from
exercising a property interest because of the race of a person with whom he
will or may associate," an unlawful act. Roisman, supra note 112, at 538-39.
113. See Donner, 623 A.2d at 308 (holding that a court must consider public
policy as well as any positive rules of law in deciding whether to enforce a
testamentary disposition).
114. Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias
in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy
Reform, 66 Mo. L. REV. 527, 583-84 (2001). The law makes opposite-sex
marriage extremely accessible, and when those opposite-sex couples divorce,
the law makes it just as easy to remarry. Id. at 584.
115. Id. at 588. The Supreme Court has suggested that the right of a
testator to dispose of property has been recognized as such for hundreds of
years. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). One expert even suggested
that Hodel stands for the proposition that the right to pass on property at
death is a constitutionally protected right. Ronald Chester, Is the Right to
Devise Property Constitutionally Protected? - The Strange Case of Hodel v.
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when analyzing public policy concerns of testamentary conditions,
courts are bound to perform a balancing test, weighing the right of
the testator to dispose of his or her property against the impact
the provision will have on preventing lawful marriages.11 6
As a result, courts have reached inconsistent results when
attempting to balance both of these important and competing
policies.' 1 7
This Comment seeks to clarify which types of
testamentary conditions in restraint of marriage are valid and to
distinguish those that are against public policy.
Part II of this Comment described partial restraints and the
reasonableness test to which those restraints are subjected."18 As
previously discussed, the reasonableness of a condition depends
largely upon the facts and circumstances of the case.119 In other
words, reasonableness depends on whether or not the condition
unfairly limits the beneficiary's opportunity to marry under the
circumstances of the case.120 While the reasonableness analysis is
fact based, certain principles of general application have arisen in
two scenarios: conditions tending to induce divorce and those
tending to restrict marriage.121
A. EncouragingDivorce Is Different from Encouraging
Marriageto a Certain Class of Individuals
The distinction between conditions encouraging divorce and
those encouraging marriage to a certain class is key to
understanding public policy concerns; the two are different, and
the separate policy concerns relating to each should not be
confused or misapplied.
It is a widely accepted principle that testamentary conditions
Irving, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (1995). If Chester is correct, there is a
new line of analysis that must necessarily follow.
116. See Ransdell, 50 N.E. at 114 (holding that society's emphasis on the
importance of lawful marriages is no less important than a testator's freedom
to dispose of his property through an instrument like a will); see also POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY § 516 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1974) (writing that
courts must balance the freedom of disposition with the conditional behavior
set out in the property transfer).
117. Storrow, supra note 114, at 588.
118. See supra part II (discussing the different types of partial restraints on
marriage).
119. See Winterland, 59 N.E.2d at 663 (holding that the validity of conditions
depends on the "circumstances of each particular case"); see also In re Harris'
Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1955) (holding that reasonableness
depends on the "purpose and effect under the circumstances of a particular
case").
120. POWELL, supra note 116, § 516.
121. Id.; see also Hall, 631 N.E.2d at 807-08 (distinguishing between a
condition encouraging divorce and a condition preventing marriage to certain
individuals).
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that encourage divorce or separation are unreasonable and, thus,
against public policy. 122 Quite obvious to this notion is the
importance of family;123 the "social objectionability" of disturbing a
harmonious familial relationship outweighs any right to dispose of
property. 124
However, the social considerations surrounding conditions
that merely restrain marriage to a certain group are quite
different, and several courts have mindfully noted this
distinction. 125 There is generally no concern about disrupting the
family unit as there is with divorce conditions because such
restrictions are typically only on first marriages. 126 Courts are
therefore left to consider other policy implications when
determining the reasonableness of the condition, such as the
transferee's desire to choose whom he or she marries, the
transferor's wish in setting the terms of the testamentary gift, and
the parent's or guardian's inclination to guide his or her family
members.127 In practice, a testator limiting a transferee's desire to
choose a spouse is usually not contrary to public policy unless that

122. See id. at 807 (holding that a condition that tends to encourage divorce
or separation of a husband and wife is against public policy); see also Gerbing,
337 N.E.2d at 33 (holding that testamentary conditions that tend to
"aggravate normal differences" or exert a "disruptive influence upon an
otherwise normally harmonious marriage" are against public policy);
Winterland, 59 N.E.2d at 663 (holding that a testamentary condition that
disturbs or destroys an existing marriage is against the public policy of
Illinois); Mau v. Heller, 159 N.W.2d 82, 84 (Wis. 1968) (holding that a
testamentary condition that "attempts ... to break up an already existing
marriage" is against public policy).
123. Inducing the beneficiary to obtain a divorce is a true restraint on
marriage. Storrow, supra note 114, at 589. Additionally, preservation of the
family has "been a priority of both courts and legislatures" for a long time. Id.
at 527.
124. POWELL, supra note 116, § 78.02.
125. See, e.g., Liberman, 18 N.E.2d at 660 (holding that a condition to induce
the beneficiary to marry "in a manner desired by the testator" is a reasonable
restriction and not contrary to public policy); see also Hall, 631 N.E.2d at 808
(holding that a condition to induce beneficiary not to marry a certain class of
individuals was reasonable and not against public policy).
126. See, e.g., Liberman, 18 N.E.2d at 662 (describing a clause restricting
only the beneficiary's first marriage).
127. Id. A careful weighing of these factors will normally result in a partial
restraint being reasonable, provided there is still the possibility of "some"
marriage. Id. Restraints premised on the theory of parental guidance are not
unreasonable. Mau, 159 N.W.2d at 84. This "father-knows-best" principle is
effective because a parent presumably knows his or her child better than any
other person. Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the
Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 485 (2006). However,
experts have made the argument that this principle is flawed because
testators cannot make rational decisions. Id. at 484.
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choice is unreasonably limited. 128
Even without a power of appointment, it is clear that this
type of provision cannot encourage divorce. A Max Feinberg-type
clause is one in partial restraint, conditioning the receipt of money
on a potential beneficiary marrying within a certain class of
individuals. 129 As soon as one of Max's descendants married
outside the Jewish faith, he or she was "deceased for all purposes
of this instrument as of the date of such marriage."1o Thus, the
restriction was only on first marriages. Given the different policy
implications it is a blatant misapplication of the law to compare a
Max Feinberg-type condition with conditions encouraging
divorce.13 1 The Illinois Supreme Court recognized this common
error, noting that Max's provision "involves the decision to marry,
not an incentive to divorce." 132 Additionally, should a pure Max
Feinberg-type provision be litigated in Illinois courts in the future,
the Supreme Court has made clear that "the public policy of the
state of Illinois protects the ability of an individual to distribute
his property, even after his death, as he chooses, with minimal
restrictions under state law." 133 While not entirely dispositive or
instructive on how a court will treat such a provision, the court
has indicated how courts should balance public policy concerns
128. Compare Maddox, 52 Va. (1 Gratt.) at 809 (holding a provision limiting
the beneficiary's choice of potential spouses to five or six men contrary to
public policy), with Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 831 (finding that a provision
limiting the beneficiary's choice to a Jewish woman with Jewish parents was
not against public policy; while the Jewish population in the beneficiary's town
was small, the Jewish population around the country was substantial). But
see Sherman, supra note 34, at 1319-22 (arguing that courts apply the
reasonable "numbers-based approach" to qualifying spouses inconsistently and
that a blanket rule invalidating all provisions limiting a beneficiary's choice of
marriage should be used in its place).
Secondary authorities tend to disagree with the blanket approach and,
instead, favor the reasonable approach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (1983) (making clear that a restriction on a
donative transfer is valid if it "does not unreasonably limit the transferee's
opportunity to marry"); 19 ILL. PRAC., ESTATE PLANNING & ADMIN. § 188:11
(5th ed. 2008) (explaining that testamentary conditions reasonably restricting
the beneficiary's marriage to a person of a particular faith are generally
upheld). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003) (favoring
the blanket approach in finding contrary to public policy any provision that
inhibits the beneficiary's selection of a spouse).
129. In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d at 550. In order to benefit from
Max's trust, a beneficiary had to marry a person whose religious belief aligned
with the Jewish faith. Id.
130. Id. at 550.
131. Id. at 550-51. The court cited Randsdell, Gerbing, and Winterland, all
cases where the instrument's creator intended to coerce the beneficiary to
obtain a divorce. Id.
132. In re Estate of Feinberg,919 N.E.2d at 899.
133. Id. at 896.
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with disputed will and trust provisions.
B. The Possibilityof ContinuingInducements
Testamentary conditions that encourage divorce or
unreasonably restrain the transferee's choice of a spouse must
have the "tendency" of accomplishing those results in order to
violate public policy. 134 Consequently, given that a testamentary
provision does not take effect until the testator dies, 13 5 the
provision correspondingly cannot violate public policy until the
testator dies.136
This principle has traditionally been applied where the
beneficiary's status is fixed and ascertainable at the date of the
testator's death and nothing more can be done to change that
status. 37 However, the notion that there must be a continuing
inducement has also been applied at the time the suit for
enforcement is brought.138 Since the policy analysis is fact based,
courts need to look at the circumstances of each case at the time
the action is filed and assess whether the restraint on marriage is
truly a restraint. 3 9
The Illinois Supreme Court, focusing on Max's wife's scheme
exercised pursuant to her power of appointment, found no
continuing inducement because her plan "operated on the date of
her death to determine which ... grandchildren qualified for
Even absent the power of
distribution on that date."140
appointment, a Max Feinberg-type provision is not a true restraint
because there is no continuing inducement. Max's provision
removed his grandchildren from his trust as soon as he or she
married a non-Jewish individual.141 At the time the action was
134. See, e.g., Hall, 631 N.E.2d at 807 (holding that "[a] condition to a devise,
the tendency of which is to encourage or bring about separation of husband
and wife, is against public policy.").
135. Mau, 159 N.W.2d at 84; see also Clarke v. Clarke (In re Clark's Estate),
57 P.2d 5, 8 (Colo. 1936) (holding that a will speaks "as though it had been
written immediately prior to death").
136. Clarke, 57 P.2d at 8; Mau, 159 N.W.2d at 84.
137. See Mau, 159 N.W.2d at 84-85 (holding that any portion of property the
beneficiary was to receive was fixed as of the death of the testator); see also
Clarke, 57 P.2d at 10 (holding that the right to take the testator's property
was determined as of the testatrix's death).
138. See Hall, 631 N.E.2d at 808 (holding that at the time the plaintiff
brought suit for construction, "the condition in the will had no 'tendency to
encourage divorce or bring about a separation of husband and wife"').
139. See, e.g., Mau, 159 N.W.2d at 85 (holding that public policy should only
deal with continuing inducements and not provisions that are not truly
restraints).
140. In re Estate of Feinberg,919 N.E.2d at 903.
141. In re Estate of Feinberg,891 N.E.2d at 550. The provision granted each
beneficiary a one-year grace period for his or her spouse to convert. Id. The
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brought and the grandchildren were notified of the provision, all of
Max's descendents poised to benefit were married for over oneyear, 142 making it impossible to be reinstated into Max's trust.143
Thus, each descendant's beneficiary status was already
determined and unchangeable. As long as a provision does not
involve a continuing inducement, it should be upheld.
C. Judges Cannot Create PublicPolicy
The ultimate determination of whether or not a condition
violates public policy depends on what the judge believes the
underlying policy to be; a judge cannot do so based on mere
conjecture or opinion.144 Therefore, a judge must decide if the
provision goes against established law or the spirit of the law.145
In the law of succession, public policy considerations have
become increasingly important, and courts should be extremely
cautious in their analysis. 4 6 While policies invariably change,147
precedent should not be overridden by unduly intrusive new policy
decisions;148 where case law provides a guiding standard, that
standard should be followed.149 Many courts, however, view case
law governing testamentary marriage conditions as antiquated,
according it an insignificant level of importance' 50 and instead
relying on principles of public policy. To avoid unnecessary
reliance on policy, as was the case in the Illinois Appellate Court
decision, state legislatures need to take action and codify will and
trust laws dealing with testamentary marriage conditions.
provision did not provide for the "resurrection" or reinstatement of beneficiary
status after that one year or if the beneficiary divorced within that year.
142. In re Estate of Feinberg,919 N.E.2d at 892.
143. In re Estate of Feinberg,891 N.E.2d at 550.
144. See Magee v. O'Neill, 19 S.C. 170, 185 (1883) (holding that a judge's
opinion as to whether public interest would be better advanced by invalidating
a provision is an improper basis for such a decision).
145. Id. A judge ought to base his decision off of more than just his opinion
because public policy is vague. Id. Yet policy has become a seemingly
important part of judicial action. Id. Many see this reliance on public policy
as unreasonable. See Alan B. Handler, Judging Public Policy, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 301, 302 (2000) (writing that public policy has unreasonably invaded
judicial decision making).
146. Snodgrass,275 P.2d at 864.
147. See id. (cautioning that "at different times very different views have
been entertained as to what is injurious to the public"); see also POWELL,
supra note 116, § 516 (explaining that because public policy has changed over
time, the precedential value of decided cases has been weakened).
148. Handler, supra note 145, at 302.
149. See id. at 307 (explaining that newly created public policy should guide
judicial decisions only where "precedent and authority fail to guide").
150. See In re Estate of Feinberg,891 N.E.2d at 553 (Quinn, J., concurring)
(noting that most cases cited by both the majority and the dissent are over
fifty years old).
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V. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY:
STATUTES CODIFYING ESTATE PLANNING RULES
A. The Need for Uniformity
State legislatures should adopt the unreasonable limitation
standard for invalidating testamentary conditions, as set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers). As
previously mentioned, states courts come down differently on the
issue of testamentary incentive conditions based on marriage.15 1
The lack of uniformity in validating or invalidating such
provisions creates a variety of problems, especially when two or
more states are involved in a dispute involving both real and
personal property. 152
With regards to testamentary trusts of personal property, a
testator is free to choose the state law that governs the validity of
his or her trust, as long as the state has a substantial relation to
the trust.153 With few limitations, a testator may hand pick a
state where he is certain his provision will be given effect. 154
Additionally, the validity of a will disposing of personal property is
governed by the law of the state in which the property is located;155
however, probate law varies among states.156 Thus, regardless of
the instrument used to dispose of personal property, there is
inevitably the possibility of a problematic conflict of laws between
the states, mandating a need for uniformity.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") already provides states with uniform laws in
the estate planning area through the enactment of the Uniform

151. See supra part I (explaining how state courts have reached different
conclusions when presented with the provisions that are testamentary
incentive conditions based on marriage).
152. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 291 (2nd ed. 1992).
153. Id. § 296. If a testator fails to specify the local law to govern the
administration of his trust, then the trust is governed by the state in which
the testator was domiciled prior to his or her death. Id.; see also Amerige v.
Attorney Gen., 88 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Mass. 1949) (holding that under ordinary
circumstances, the validity of a trust is determined by the law of the state in
which the testator is domiciled at his death).
154. See Amerige, 88 N.E.2d at 133 (holding as valid testamentary trusts of
personal property in a foreign state expressly specified by the testator in his or
her trust but invalid in the State of the testator's domicile); see also BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note 152, § 296 (writing that a trust that would be invalid
under the law of the testator's domicile but valid under the law of the
testator's chosen state is valid).
155. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO WILLS & ESTATES 311
(Charles White ed., Random House Reference 2004) (1995).
156. Id.
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Trust Code15 7 and Uniform Probate Code. 15 8 While both uniform
codes attempt to clarify and simplify the law, neither takes a
stance on the type of testamentary conditions described in this
Comment. 159
There is a growing trend for adopting the provisions outlined
in these codes; nineteen states and the District of Colombia have
adopted the Uniform Trust Code16 0 and eighteen states have
adopted the Uniform Probate Code.16 1 The NCCUSL needs to take
action and amend these uniform codes to provide guidance to state
legislatures on what the uniform law should be regarding
testamentary marriage conditions. Once the NCCUSL takes
action, states can then either enact the provisions of the uniform
codes or create their own legislation consistent with the codes.
The question then becomes, what rule should be advanced?
B. States Should Codify a Modified Restatement
(Second) of PropertyApproach
While a number of states have adopted the uniform codes, a
handful of states have created their own statues and regulations.
These regulations, like the uniform codes, are also deficient in
providing clarity with respect to the provisions governing incentive
conditions regarding marriage. 162 The lack of state codification
157. The Uniform Trust Code, the first attempt at codifying uniform trust
laws, was created to provide uniform rules where states diverge or on which
the law is unclear or unknown. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2000).
158. The Uniform Probate Code was created:
(A) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents,
missing persons, protected persons, minors and incapacitated persons;
(B) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of the decedent's property; (C) to promote a speedy and
efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making
distribution to the decedent's successors; (D) to facilitate the use and
enforcement of certain trusts; (E) to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102 (amended 2001).
159. The Uniform Trust Code merely hints at a position by stating that a
"trust may be created only to the extent its purposes are lawful, [and] not
contrary to public policy. . . ." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (2000). But there is no
specific provision in the code that sets forth a specific rule regarding
testamentary conditions in partial restraint of marriage.
160. AMY MORRIS HEss, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§

7 (3rd ed. 2007). While nearly

forty percent of states have adopted the Uniform Trust Code, it is important to
note that a "substantial variation" still exists. Id.
161. Id. States have adopted all or part of uniform probate laws or have set
forth statutes codifying all or part of the common law governing will and
trusts. REUTLINGER, supra note 61, at 4. "Major differences exist in some
areas and minor differences in most." Id.
162. Steiner, supra note 32, at 898. States have the power to regulate the
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has led to many negative consequences, including uncertainty as
to which testamentary conditions are valid163 and armies of
litigious beneficiaries who will do almost anything to get their
money, even sever the same family relations that courts try to
protect.16 4 It necessarily follows that states codifying regulations
or statutes regarding testamentary conditions will resolve
uncertainty as to what a testator can or cannot do, curing the
problem at its source.
The two relevant Restatements in this area, the Restatement
(Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) and Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, diverge from other subject areas in that, instead
of restating the current law, the drafters suggest new laws that
buttress their idea of what the law should be. 65 As discussed in
part 11,166 the Restatement (Third) of Trusts is much stricter in
assessing testamentary restrictions conditioning marriage to a
certain class of people than the Restatement (Second) of Property
(Donative Transfers). 6 7 While these approaches may be both
innovative and controversial, the drafters provided two possible
analyses that state courts and legislatures can adopt.
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts should not be codified by
the states; it places a complete bar on any restriction that is
contrary to public policy,'6 8 suggesting that a condition interfering
with a person's exercise of freedom to marry falls within the bar.169
testamentary transfer of property. Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (1 How.) 490, 493
(1850).
New York, California, Georgia, Indiana, Texas, Washington,
Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania have already codified
trust principles. HESS, supranote 160, § 7.
163. Steiner, supra note 32, at 898.
164. See id. at 931 (writing that potential beneficiaries in wills and trusts
and their families often become divided over the distribution relating to the
conditions).
165. LEFCOE & THOMAS, supra note 61, at 11. Any criticism regarding the
Restatement (Second) of Property is also applicable to the Restatement (Third)
of Trusts. Id. at 37.
166. See supra part II (analyzing the differences between the two pertinent
Restatements of the law: the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative
Transfers) and Restatement (Third) of Trusts).
167. See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2004) (writing that the Restatements are divided on
whether courts should sustain marriage restrictions).
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) (2003).
169. Id. § 29 cmt. j. The drafters of this Restatement thought it to be
inherently dangerous to limit the beneficiary's choice of a spouse or postpone
the date of marriage. Id. While this Restatement recognizes the innate
differences between conditional provisions that encourage divorce and those
that may discourage marriage to a certain class, the two categories are lumped
together for purposes of analysis. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts was
written in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative
Transfers). See Roisman, supra note 112, at 472 (writing that the prior
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This complete ban on partial restraints is over expansive and
"hostile."17 0 One expert in support of this "blanket rule" argued
that courts applying the rule would reach more consistent results,
providing more predictability to creators of testamentary
instruments.171 However, codifying this Restatement (Third) of
Trusts will not solve the problem of uncertainty or unnecessary
litigation. Courts would still be called on to determine whether or
not the condition at issue satisfies the confusing and vague public
policy requirement. 172 Additionally, adoption of this approach
would completely disregard the transferor's wishes in distributing
his wealth.173
The Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers)
approach, on the other hand, should be codified by states because
it is a more carefully tailored and straightforward approach. It
sets forth an unreasonable limitation standard that gives effect to
partial restraints unless the beliefs of the transferee are so
contrary to the requirements of the provision that marriage is
unlikely to ever occur or the number of eligible spouses is
negligible.174 These exceptions provide a safeguard against the
public policy concerns surrounding a testator limiting a person's
freedom to choose a spouse, while at the same time balancing the
personal freedom of the transferee to choose a spouse.
A state codifying this approach effectively instructs the
transferor that he or she cannot create conditions that
75
unreasonably limit the transferee's opportunity to marry,
providing a very specific guideline for courts to follow (assuming a
restatement of trusts held that partial restraints on marriage are "not
normally invalid."). However, to justify radically changing their stance, the
drafters merely stated that the amount and force of the supporting authorities
cited in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts was "diminished by close
examination." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 Reporter's
Notes (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999)).
170. Langbein, supra note 167, at 1109 n.28. Langbein argues that while
proponents of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts approach depict all restraints
on marriage as "wholly objectionable," there is no legal basis for finding such
provisions objectionable or unjustifiable. Id.
171. Sherman, supra note 34, at 1322. Sherman also argues that creating
standards for evaluating partial restraints is a difficult task for courts to
achieve. Id.
172. See Steiner, supra note 32, at 931 (writing that codifying the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts would be problematic because "courts would be
left to determine which particular conditions satisfy the ambiguous statute").
173. Id. at 932. There is a "powerful" argument for giving effect to a
transferor's wishes. Langbein, supra note 167, at 1110.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. c
(1983). Critics of this "numbers-based" approach argue that the validity turns
on the "fortuities of geographic and demographic factors." Sherman, supra
note 34, at 1321-22.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (1983).
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transferor is familiar with the person or persons to whom he or she
is transferring his property). Under this method, for example, a
transferor should know that provisions conditioning the receipt of
money or property on a religious person marrying outside his or
her faithl 76 as well as provisions limiting the transferee's choice of
spouse by culture or gender are expressly prohibited where the
transferee has strong views to the contrary.
It is true that not all litigation can be dispelled under this
method; since this approach is still fact intensive, litigants may
very well want courts to determine whether a restriction
unreasonably limits his or her right to take the property in issue.
However, the suggested regulatory or statutory guidance will
decrease the overall number of controversial cases by instructing
transferor's as to what is proper, as well as will best effectuate the
balancing of the competing public policies at issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trust and will creators often attempt to exert influence over a
transferee's work ethic, education, religion, and philanthropic
values.177 While protecting tradition and family values are the
main goals of estate planning, 76 "dead hand" control over the
actions of the living has its limits. 1 79 Individuals, like Max
Feinberg, creating testamentary instruments need to recognize
that older generations place a greater value on tradition than
modern generations who crave change over old customs. Faced
with this reality, it will become increasingly more difficult to
enforce provisions mandating a strict adherence to tradition. The
unreasonable limitation standard seems to be the most practical
way of accommodating the young-minded belief system with the
conservative mentality.

176. Id. § 6.2 cmt. c, illus. 3; see also Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not
Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV.
634, 645 n.44 (2008) (writing that "a condition requiring that the beneficiary
marry a certain person or that a religious recipient marry someone outside her
faith would be unreasonable.").
177. Steiner, supra note 32, at 897, 908; see also Tate, supra note 127, at 453
(explaining that conditions in incentive trusts generally fall into three main
categories: (1) those that encourage the prospective beneficiary to pursue an
education; (2) those that promote a particular way of living; and (3) those that
encourage the beneficiary to have a successful career).
178. Steiner, supra note 32, at 906.
179. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the
Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (describing how lawmakers should
consider "how long" and in "what ways" a testator proposes to control property
after his or her death).

